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Abstract   There is a presumption that individual transferable quotas (ITQs)
will provide incentives to invest optimally in fishing boats. This paper shows
that this is not true when the crew is paid a share of the catch value instead of a
parametric wage. This system of remuneration distorts investment incentives in
an ITQ system of fisheries management and leads to overinvestment, but on a
much smaller scale than open access. This can be corrected with a tax on fish
landings, but not with a tax on quota holdings.
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Introduction
The lay system of remuneration is used extensively in fisheries. Under this system,
fishermen are paid a share of the catch value, perhaps after subtracting some costs,
rather than a fixed wage. There may, however, also be a fixed wage element, so that
fishermen get a share of the catch value in addition to the fixed wage, or a fixed
wage as a minimum in case the fishing trip turns out to be unrewarding. Recently,
McConnell and Price (2006) examined the rationale and the implications of this sys-
tem compared to a fixed wage. They argue that the lay system is primarily an
optimal incentive contract. Matthiasson (1999) also discussed the lay system in a
similar spirit, but in a less general setting, while earlier explanations saw the lay
system primarily as a risk sharing device (Sutinen 1979).
Whatever the rationale for the lay system, it can be shown to have consequences
for investment incentives in ITQ fisheries. This paper expands the analysis of an
earlier paper, where it was shown that revenue sharing would distort investment de-
cisions in an ITQ fishery with uncertain catch quotas, resulting in excessive
investments in fishing boats (Hannesson 2000). It was noted that a crew share in ex-
cess of what would correspond to equilibrium in the labor market would correct for
this, but the discussion of corrective measures was otherwise left open.
Over the last few years, there has been a revival of the discussion of taxes as
corrective measures in fisheries management. This was initiated by Weitzman
(2002) and followed up by Jensen and Vestergaard (2003) and Hannesson and
Kennedy (2005). The focal point has been whether and when taxes could be used in-
stead of catch quotas as instruments to control fish stocks. None of these papers
explicitly considered investments in fishing boats. This could be an important omis-
sion, because investment decisions in fisheries where stocks vary for reasons other
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than fishing are distinctly different from decisions about fishing effort to be applied
or the catch volume to be taken within any given period of time (Hannesson 1987).
This paper examines whether a tax on fish landings or quota holdings would correct for
the tendency to overinvest in fishing boats in ITQ fisheries with revenue sharing. It is
found that a tax on landings would do so, while a tax on quota holdings would not.
The Model
For stocks controlled by total allowable catches (TACs), the TACs are determined
with reference to the status of the stocks at the time the TAC is set (usually once a
year). Fish stock abundance is determined not just by past catches but also by envi-
ronmental fluctuations affecting stock growth, both growth of individual fish in the
stock and recruitment of young fish to the stock. The TACs, therefore, fluctuate con-
siderably, due to fluctuations in environmental conditions. The focus here is on the
implications of these fluctuations; so for simplicity, it is assumed that the total per-
mitted catch (Q) is a purely random variable with the probability density function
f(Q). This ignores the fact that the said fluctuations are typically serially correlated,
but omitting this and concentrating on the random element is not misleading in this
context, as the time profile of investment is not an issue.
For a fleet consisting of identical boats representing the cost-minimizing tech-
nology at given factor prices, the expected annual rent (V) from the fishery will be
(Hannesson 1987, 2000):
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where p is the price of fish, c is the operating cost per unit of fish, k is the catch per
boat if used at full capacity, N is the number of boats, δ is the rate of boat deprecia-
tion, r is the rate of return on foregone investment, K is the boat cost, and W is the
opportunity cost of labor used on each boat. For simplicity, the so-called stock effect
is ignored so that c and k are independent of the size of the exploited fish stock.
With k constant, the upper limit to what the fleet can catch is kN, so the total catch
will be min(Q, kN). F(.) is the cumulative density function, so 1 – F(kN) is the prob-
ability of Q ≥ kN.
Maximizing the expected rent implies:
() ( ) () , p c k F kN r K W o −− [] =+ + 1 δ (2)
where No is the optimal (i.e., rent-maximizing) number of boats.
When fishermen are paid a share 1 – s of the (gross) catch value, instead of a
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Equilibrium investment can be found by considering a boat owner whose boat needs
replacement. The boat owner will compare the annual revenue he would obtain fromTaxes, ITQs, Investments, and Revenue Sharing 365
renewing his boat and the annual revenue he would get by renting out or selling his
quota to those who remain in the fishery. The willingness of the latter to pay for
quotas they rent or buy is limited by the increased revenue they would be able to
obtain by the additional quota. A boat owner will earn additional revenue from addi-
tional quota only when the quota he has from before does not allow him the full use
of his boat. In fisheries with TACs that vary from year to year, quotas are usually
determined as shares of the TAC.1 Hence, the smaller the TAC share that a boat
owner has, the more likely it is that he will be able to use an additional share. Those
with the smallest shares will, therefore, be willing to pay the highest price for an ad-
ditional share. In a fishery where all hold the same quotas, the value of the quota
sold or rented out by a boat owner who chooses not to renew his boat will be maxi-
mized if it is sold or rented out in equal amounts to all remaining boat owners.
Assuming a quota market that accomplishes this greatly simplifies the analysis, but
it is not far fetched to imagine a market that could operate like that, renting out or
selling portions of the quota no longer used by a boat owner to the highest bidder.
With this assumption about the quota market, we find the willingness to pay for
the quota of a boat that will not be renewed as follows. If one boat leaves the fishery
and its quota is distributed in equal amounts to those that remain, the expected rev-
enue of each remaining boat will increase by (the negative of) the derivative of
equation (3) with respect to N, treating the number of boats as a continuous variable
















This total willingness to pay would, in effective quota markets, be equal to what a
boat owner could get for renting out his quota (or the annualized revenue from sell-
ing it once and for all). In equilibrium this would be equal to the net revenue the
boat owner could get from renewing his boat, which is given by equation (3).
Hence, setting expression (4) equal to (3) gives an equation for the equilibrium
number of boats in an ITQ fishery:
() ( ) ( ) . ps c k F kN r K −− [] =+ 1 δ (5)
This determines N, the number of boats in the fishery, for given values of the re-
maining arguments in equation (5), which are determined by technology, nature, or
market forces.
If the ITQs under a lay system are to result in an optimum number of boats,
equation (5) must have the same solution as equation (2). This would imply:
p s k F kN W () ( ) . 11 −− [] = (6)
This is not compatible with equilibrium in the labor market. The left-hand side is the
1 Determining individual quotas in this way has the advantage of automatically adjusting the individual
quotas to the TAC. It is, of course, possible to do things differently. In the first years after implementing
ITQs in the orange roughy fishery, New Zealand used fixed tonnages with the intention of buying back
quotas when the TAC was small and selling additional quotas when the TAC was large. It turned out that
the prospects for the orange roughy stocks had been forecast much too optimistically, and this method
was soon abandoned and replaced by share quotas.Hannesson 366
remuneration of the crew when the total quota is sufficiently large for all boats to be
fully used, but the crew will also obtain income when the quotas are smaller than
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If the labor market is sufficiently competitive, the expected remuneration of
fishermen will be equal to the opportunity wage, so equation (6) cannot hold. In-
stead, the left-hand side will be smaller than the right-hand side, implying that N is
greater than the optimal value.
The reason for the excessive investment in fishing boats is that the revenue ac-
cruing to a boat owner who invests in a new boat and who has already factored in
the cost of his crew, would not be fully recovered by other boat owners who rent the
quota, as they have to share some of it with the fishermen they hire. In the globally
optimal solution, it does not matter whether a boat is added to the fishery or its
quota distributed among the existing boats; the revenue from investing in a new boat
is the same as the revenue realized by distributing the quota of that boat efficiently
(i.e., equally) among all remaining boats. This solution would be realized if the fish-
ermen were paid a given wage independent of how much they catch (Hannesson
2000).  In that case, the boat owner would keep all the additional revenue resulting
from additional quota. Under the lay system we get an overinvestment in boats. In-
creasing the number of boats beyond the optimal level lowers the revenue of each
boat owner and raises the revenue from distributing the quota of a marginal boat to
the remaining boats, with an equilibrium being reached where the revenue kept by
the remaining boat owners is equal to the revenue of the marginal boat owner.
For optimal investment to be obtained under the lay system, EM > W; i.e.,
fishermen’s expected income would have to be greater than the opportunity cost of
labor. In other words, fishermen would have to possess some market power giving
them a greater income than the opportunity cost of their labor. This is conceivable.
In countries with highly organized labor markets, the share parameter is an outcome
of negotiations between fishermen’s unions and boat owners’ organizations. Even if
labor market conditions are likely to influence the outcomes of such negotiations,
they could do so imperfectly and with a considerable time lag. In such centralized
labor markets the share parameter is likely to be the same for all, except for differ-
ent qualifications and roles of different crew members. Under decentralized
conditions the lay system can still evolve, as indeed it did in earlier times. As
pointed out by McConnell and Price (2006), if the share parameter differs among
boats, it could be an additional source of inefficiency under an ITQ system.
It may be noted that if the boat owners could set the share parameter unilater-
ally, they would presumably set it as low as possible. With mobility in the labor
market, they would not set it lower than what would make the expected remunera-
tion of labor equal to its opportunity wage, as otherwise they would get no crew.
This is precisely what is incompatible with optimal investment. For that we need
equation (6), which is incompatible with EM = W (cf. [7]). This presumes that the
share parameter is fixed irrespective of the TAC. If the boat owners could change it
at will, it could be varied with the TAC, in which case the crew would always get
just the competitive wage and no distortion of investment incentives would occur.
Figure 1 compares optimal investment in fishing boats, according to equation
(2), with the equilibrium investment in an ITQ fishery with a share system where
EM = W (equation [5]). This represents equilibrium in a competitive labor market;Taxes, ITQs, Investments, and Revenue Sharing 367
fishermen’s expected income would be equal to the opportunity cost of their labor.
The example on which the figure is based is explained in the Appendix. The figure
shows how the number of boats increases with the price of fish, but in an ITQ fish-
ery with a revenue sharing system, it is always greater than optimal. As the price
increases towards infinity, the number of boats increases to the number needed to
take the maximum catch quota (100).
Taxes
Figure 1 suggests that a tax on landings would reduce investment in boats and bring
about an optimal level of investment, as the size of the fleet in the ITQ fishery falls
with the price of fish. Note that if the price in figure 1 is interpreted as price after
tax, the fishermen are implicitly assumed to be paid a share of the catch value after
tax, as the curve in figure 1 takes into account equilibrium in the labor market.
With a tax on the fish landings, the parameter p in the above equations (except
[1] and [2]) is replaced by p(1 – t), where t is the tax rate. Equation (5) becomes:
pt s c kF k N r K () ( ) ( ) . 11 −− [] − [] =+ δ (5′)
It is now possible that ITQs will result in an optimal number of boats. If equations
(2) and (5′) have the same solution, we get:
ps t kF k N W o 11 1 −− [] − [] = () ( ) . (6′)
When fishermen get a share of the revenues after tax, equation (7) becomes:
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Figure 1.  Number of Boats (N*) in an ITQ-controlled Fishery where Fishermen
Receive a Share of the Revenue from Fishing versus Optimal Number (Nopt) of BoatsHannesson 368
Setting W equal to EM implies:
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Clearly, it is possible to find a combination of a tax and a share parameter that pro-
vides incentives to invest optimally while being consistent with equilibrium in the
labor market (solving equations [6′] and [8] simultaneously). Figure 2 shows the tax
rate that would ensure optimal investment, as a function of gross market price. The
model behind this figure is explained in the Appendix.
It does not matter whether or not the crew share is calculated on the basis of the
price before or after tax, but needless to say, this has implications for which share is
compatible with the labor market equilibrium. If the crew share is calculated on the
basis of the pre-tax price, we get instead of equations (5′) and (6′):
ps t ck Fk N rK () ( ) () , −− [] − [] =+ 1 δ (5′′)
ps t kF k N W o () ( ) , 11 − + − [] = (6′′)
while equation (7) is now valid for EM. Setting EM equal to W gives:
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and again the optimal t and s can be found from solving equations (6′′) and (8′) si-
Figure 2.  Landings Tax Rate that would Ensure Optimum InvestmentTaxes, ITQs, Investments, and Revenue Sharing 369
multaneously. The optimal tax rate is the same whether or not the fishermen’s remu-
neration is calculated on the basis of pre- or post-tax price, with the share parameter, s,
absorbing the difference between the two cases. Figure 3 shows the boat owners’ share
of the catch value in the two cases. The fishermen’s share (1 – s) of the catch value is,
of course, lower in case their income is calculated on the basis of the pre-tax price.
The corrective tax is the same in both cases, which can be seen as follows. If we
want to achieve the same investment and labor market equilibrium in both cases, the
price received by boat owners and fishermen, respectively, must be the same in both
cases. Let t and s, versus t* and s*, denote the tax rate and the share parameter in the
two cases. Identical prices to fishermen and boat owners in both cases implies:
pt sps () ()( ) * 11 1 −− = − (9a)
pt s p sp t () . ** 1 − = − (9b)
Adding equations (9a) and (9b) implies 1 – t = 1 – t*.
In contrast to a tax on landings, a tax on quota holdings would not work as an
instrument to achieve optimal investment in an ITQ fishery. With a tax on quota
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The last term in this expression is the tax on quota holdings. It is assumed that the
quota system is of the share quota variety, and with all boat owners holding equal


















Figure 3.  Boat Owner Share of Revenues (s) when Fishermen’s Remuneration
is Calculated from Revenue Before versus After TaxHannesson 370
We see that putting equation (3′) equal to equation (4′) nets out the quota tax term,
and we end up with equation (5), as in the absence of any tax. A corollary of this is
that a tax on quota holdings would be neutral, so it would not cause inoptimal in-
vestment if the economic system is otherwise without distortions of investment
incentives.
Conclusion
Open-access fisheries are known to result in wasteful competition, not least in the
form of excessive investment in fishing boats. As ITQs provide incentives to maxi-
mize the value of a given catch quota and minimize the cost of taking it, the
presumption is that this would result in an optimal investment in fishing boats. This
paper has demonstrated that this will not occur if the fishermen are paid a share of
the revenues rather than a fixed wage.
It is not suggested that the investment equilibrium under an ITQ system with
share payments need be similar to the open-access equilibrium; indeed the presump-
tion is that the major difference is between the ITQ equilibrium and the open-access
equilibrium (see Hannesson 2000), and that an ITQ system will in any case be a ma-
jor improvement over an open-access system. Neither is it suggested that a fine
tuning of the investment decisions through a landings tax will be easy, especially in
the presence of imperfect information about costs. What is suggested is that landings
taxes in ITQ fisheries will not necessarily be distortive. On the contrary, they would
improve the allocation of resources in a share system, up to a point. Taxes on quota
holdings would not correct for this, but would not be distortive.
Finally, note that the above results depend on the fixity of the share parameter s.
If it were continually revised to reflect equilibrium in the labor market, the invest-
ment incentives would not be distorted. The fishermen would then always get the
opportunity cost of their labor and no more. The share system could still serve the
purpose of an incentive contract to ensure that fishermen exert the necessary effort
to obtain an income equal to their opportunity wage.
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Appendix








Ignoring unit operating cost, c, for simplicity, and setting k = 1, the condition for
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This equation gives the optimal number of boats (No) in figure 1, where we have set
(r + δ)K = 0.1 and W = 0.9. These values will be used throughout.
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The parameter, s, must be compatible with equilibrium in the labor market, EM = W.
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Solving equations (A5) and (A6) for t and s yields the tax rate shown in figure 2.
The s is shown in figure 3. The solution of equations (6′′) and (8′) is analogous, with
the resulting s also shown in figure 3.